Uganda did not export Ebola to the DRC despite porous borders by Akello, Grace
Uganda did not export Ebola to the DRC despite porous borders
LSE Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/103557/
Version: Published Version
Online resource:
Akello, Grace (2019) Uganda did not export Ebola to the DRC despite porous 
borders. Africa at LSE (16 Dec 2019), pp. 1-5. Blog Entry. 
lseresearchonline@lse.ac.uk
https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/ 
Reuse
Items deposited in LSE Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights 
reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private 
study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights 
holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is 
indicated by the licence information on the LSE Research Online record for the item.
29/01/2020 Uganda did not export Ebola to the DRC despite porous borders | Africa at LSE
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2019/12/16/uganda-export-ebola-drc-disease-porous-borders/ 1/8
Grace Akello December 16th, 2019
Uganda did not export Ebola to the DRC despite
porous borders
2 comments | 6 shares
Estimated reading time: 5 minutes
Many livelihoods are reliant on frequent movement across the
shared border of the DRC and Uganda, which can complicate
procedures to prevent the spread of virulent diseases such as
Ebola. Professor Grace Akello describes events surrounding
Uganda’s 2019 outbreak, and the effects of government health
interventions that seek to remain partial to its citizens.
This article is part of the Public Authority blog series, with the Centre for
Public Authority and International Development at LSE.
Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) share porous
borders, as well as social and economic links. With porous borders, it is
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common for an individual to travel between Uganda and the DRC
without being sure about their current country location – particularly
when mobile phone networks oscillate between DRC and Uganda
service providers. Even when the River Lhubhiriha marks one such
border, people in this region wade through the river without thinking
about its political signi cance.
One only appreciates the extent to which these two countries’ borders
are porous (or even imaginary) when conducting  eldwork in districts
like Kasese, Bundibugyo, Nebbi, Zombo and Arua. It is said that the
Bakonzo of Uganda speak the same language and have close kinship
with the Kinande of the DRC. The same can be said of the Alur, Banyoro
and Lugbara – ethnic groups living in both Uganda and the DRC.
Noticeably, these border districts have market days whereby both
Ugandans and Congolese small scale traders engage in the exchange
of goods and services.
In 2018, the 11th Ebola epidemic was con rmed in DRC’s border
province of North Kivu. Different authorities, including the Government
of Uganda’s Ministry of Health, humanitarians and local leaders in high
risk districts, devised strategies to keep Uganda Ebola-free. While at the
national level Ugandans were depicted as faceless, nameless citizens
living in a high risk border district, who must be protected from catching
the virus from their risky Congolese neighbours, local leaders in Kasese
knew that families cut across borders, and Ugandans farm and sell their
agricultural produce in Congo, and vise versa.
In June 2018, an Ebola surveillance team from Uganda’s Minister of
Health (MOH) travelled over 15 kilometres into the DRC without
realising they left their target citizens, whom they were sensitising to
prevent Ebola’s spread from the DRC. Their loudspeaker
announcements advised Ugandan citizens to stop eating bush meat,
wash their hands with chlorine, and if they saw anybody with signs such
as bleeding from bodily openings – particularly if they have been to the
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DRC in the recent past – to report immediately such persons to
Uganda’s Ebola Treatment Unit, located at Bwera hospital in Kasese
district.
National vs local authority viewpoints
There was therefore a clash between national and local authorities’
viewpoints concerning the appropriateness of preventive approaches.
For instance, when the state viewed all Congolese as suspects who
must be surveilled and forced (beaten even) into washing their hands
and feet in chlorine prior to entering Uganda, local leaders viewed these
approaches as divisive, aimed at bringing disharmony among families
across borders – ‘our relatives’, as mentioned in many discussions in
Kasese. These leaders therefore disregarded such Ebola response
activities and, at best, small Ebola checkpoints only targeted unknown
Congolese and women for screening.
Indiscriminately ordering women to wash hands, for instance, on their
way back from collecting  rewood and water from the DRC was not
useful. Even women exhibited what the Ebola surveillance team
described as feigned compliance, sometimes hostility. In response, the
Ebola team deployed security forces and heavy handedness,
particularly on women who frequently crossed to the DRC side because,
as Ebola surveillance o cers and volunteers at checkpoints frequently
argued, ‘even animals there are infected and the bats must have nested
in the gardens which Ugandans are tending while in Congo – and
therefore they needed to be encouraged to adapt this habit of hand
washing.’
Families and procedures across borders
In June 2019, a Congolese mother of  ve went to the DRC from Uganda
as a caregiver for her sick father suffering from Ebola. Unfortunately her
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father succumbed to death and together with her family they returned to
Uganda after the burial. On hearing about these  ve high risk cases the
MOH immediately ordered for their quarantining at an Ebola Treatment
Unit. At the unit, some family members died (most likely of neglect).
After three days of quarantining the family, Uganda exported the high
risk Ebola-affected family back to the DRC. During my interviews with
some senior o cers at the MOH, particularly about going against
Standard Operating Procedures for Ebola by which they exported an
Ebola case out of the country, there were mixed views. Ultimately it was
agreed that no new infections resulted from the family being sent to the
DRC, where further cases were contracted by people already within the
country.
When these con rmed cases were discovered to have links with the
DRC, Ugandan o cials held cross border meetings with DRC o cials on
11 June 2019. Agreed to transfer its Ebola-infected citizens back to its
country, the DRC government stated that it had its own transport,
perhaps assisted by humanitarians. Since Uganda’s therapeutic
protocols for the virus were still in review stage, Uganda ‘allowed’ the
DRC to take back its Ebola cases. It is unfortunate that one of the sick
persons was an 11 year-old girl who died before they reached at Ebola
Treatment Unit in North Kivu. The mother who left her marital home in
Uganda to do caregiving in the DRC was also deported.
I spoke to an o cer at the Ministry of Health at the time who said:
‘It was risky to refuse DRC Ebola citizens from going back. This is
because DRC was looking at the amount of money which such
cases attract. For instance, humanitarians would release money for
surveillance, for treatment, for disposables and for Ebola staff. DRC
could not let Uganda manage that money when it is DRC citizens
who are affected.’
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Ebola and indeed any virulent disease may force people into moral,
social and political dilemmas. In 2019 Uganda was recognised globally
as a state with the world’s friendliest refugee policies, allowing in over
two million refugees from neighbouring war-affected countries
including the DRC into Uganda. Through such a policy, the government
had gone further to give refugees land where they can carry out farming
to improve their livelihood. This Ebola episode occurred only six months
after this declaration, and here Uganda was at the brink of losing its
credibility – to a great extent being depicted as a country going against
its Standard Operating Procedures for Ebola control in order to keep its
citizens safe, including breaking up harmonious families and kinship
ties.
Such events force us to re ect upon the importance of humanitarianism
in countries facing pandemics. We must ask ourselves: to what extent
are humanitarians’ contributions geared towards resolving the issue at
hand, particularly if their interventions are guided by detachment,
neutrality, seeing affected citizens as without a face, without a name,
sans social links and kinships? These are pertinent questions whether
within or across countries’ borders.
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